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Abstract
We introduce reference consumption into the standard utility function from optimal
tax analysis. Individuals compare their consumption ‘narrowly’ with those of the same
productivity, or ‘broadly’ with the average consumption across society. In both Narrow
and Broad equilibria reference consumption is an increasing function of the tax parameters,
so generating new theoretical results. Individual well-being decreases with the net wage
(net-of-tax) rate for low productivity workers under Narrow (Broad) comparisons; thus ad-
justing redistributive taxation considerations. Further, in both cases reference consumption
distorts labour supply away from the social optimum level; giving a distortion-correcting
role for taxation.
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1 Introduction
The standard optimal income tax framework (i.e., Mirrlees, 1971; Sheshinski, 1972) assumes
that individual well-being is independent of the outcomes of others. This is in contrast with the
substantial body of empirical work suggesting that income and consumption comparisons are
a key-driver of one’s subjective well-being (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Clark and Oswald,
1996; Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005; Layard, 2005; Layard et al., 2009; Senik, 2009; Clark et al.,
2008).1 Much of this research is based on survey evidence in which the main socio-economic
variable available to the researcher is income: it is an open question whether it is income or
consumption comparisons that are relevant, but in the context of the framework in this paper
the two coincide. With this in mind, our paper analyses the optimal income tax problem when
individual preferences are defined very generally over own-consumption and labour time (as in
the standard model) and the average consumption of some reference group.
Our question is as follows: how do the conventional results from the optimal linear income
tax framework change when individual well-being is decreasing in the average consumption of
some reference group and, further, the level of reference group consumption may be an argument
of individual choices, thus generating Keeping up with the Joneses behaviour? In answering
this question, we are also responding to recommendations that public economic theory should
incorporate key insights from the extensive literature on subjective well-being (Layard, 2006;
O’Donnell et al., 2014).
An empirical literature helps inform the appropriate choice of theoretical framework, in par-
ticular providing evidence on the composition of reference groups; the size of income/consump-
tion externalities; and the behavioural implications of income comparisons. First, Clark and
Senik (2010) elicit from the European Social Survey (Wave 3) that a majority of individuals
compare their income with others and, further, of those who compare, colleagues are the most
prevalently reported reference group. Second, a number of studies suggest that an increase in
reference group income or corresponding reduction in own-income reduce well-being by similar
magnitudes (Luttmer, 2005; Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005). Third, there is evidence that income com-
parisons have an upwards effect on labour supply: an individual who whose income falls behind
that of the reference group may increase their work hours in a bid to ‘Keep up with the Joneses ’
(Pe´rez-Asenjo, 2011). This is also consistent with the prevailing view that individuals do not
compare their leisure with that of others (Layard, 2006).2
1This literature has largely spawned from the well-documented ‘Easterlin Paradox’: substantial increases in real
income per capita across developed countries have not been accompanied by marked increases in average reported
well-being; though within-country higher income individuals tend to be happier than lower income individuals
(Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2001). Relative income theory (Duesenberry, 1949) provides a possible resolution: if
individual preferences are defined over consumption relative to the unweighted average in society, a ceteris paribus
increase in a given individual’s income will increase their well-being, but an increase in the average national income
will generate no such increase in individual well-being (see also van de Stadt et al., 1985).
2Though since Veblen (1899) it has been recognised that leisure may play a role in ‘displaying’ relative con-
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There is also experimental evidence that individuals may trade-off income for higher rela-
tive standing in choosing their preferred society: this is illustrated, for example, in Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2002), where individuals compare societies of equal income inequality but dif-
ferent relative positions for their hypothetical grandchildren (also see Alpizar et al., 2005; Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999).
In our framework individuals may compare their consumption ‘narrowly’ with those of the
same productivity, or ‘broadly’ with the average consumption across society as a whole.3 Indi-
viduals choose their Marshallian labour supply taking as given the reference consumption level;
but in both the Narrow and Broad cases the equilibrium level of reference consumption will
be a function of the tax parameters (and in the Narrow case also a function of productivity).
Consequently, a number of new theoretical results arise relative to the conventional theory.
Our first result concerns well-being and the net wage/net-of-tax rate. In the conventional
theory an increase in the net wage (net-of-tax) rate increases the well-being of workers at a
rate proportional to labour supply (gross earnings). In our framework, there is also a second
opposing effect. Under Narrow comparisons an increase in the net wage rate increases average
peer consumption, which acts to lower well-being because reference consumption is a negative
externality. For workers with productivity close to the reservation productivity - and so very
low labour supply - this second effect dominates the conventional effect and well-being falls with
the net wage rate. The implication is that, in contrast to the conventional theory, the worst-off
in society are no longer the voluntarily unemployed or those of lowest productivity, but instead
workers of low productivity. Next, under Broad comparisons average consumption is indepen-
dent of productivity and so well-being is unambiguously increasing in individual productivity4.
However, an increase in the net-of-tax rate is well-being reducing for workers of low productivity.
The intuition is analogous to the Narrow comparison case: the negative externality of increased
reference consumption offsets the traditional effect. In the Broad comparison case we must thus
distinguish between changes in individual productivity and the net-of-tax rate, whereas in the
Narrow case both arguments are summarised via the net wage rate.5 Finally, these well-being
results hold for both the cases where labour supply is independent of reference consumption (the
pure negative externality case) and where labour supply is an increasing function of the reference
consumption level.
sumption disparities: individual consumption is time consuming and so higher consumption may require more
leisure, whilst individuals taking leisure may notice more the consumption of others (see Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman, 2013).
3Our framework is static and so income is equivalent to consumption.
4We think of this as a cross-sectional result.
5The result that an individual’s well-being falls with the net-of-tax rate continues to hold in a ‘Piketty and Saez
(2012)’ style framework where individuals differ in both their preferences and earnings ability. However, because
such a framework does not permit interpersonal comparisons all we can say is that the sign of the inequality has
changed relative to the standard theory. For this reason, a framework with homogenous preferences affords us
more theoretical insight.
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This first result has implications for the how the social marginal welfare weight (smww)
changes with individual productivity. In modern tax analysis, the smww captures the value,
in units of public funds, that society places on awarding a given individual an additional one
unit of income (Piketty and Saez, 2012). In the conventional theory the smww is proportional
solely to the marginal utility of consumption (and any distributional weights6): the effect of
behavioural responses on well-being cancel by the Envelope theorem. In our framework, an
increase in unearned income also increases average reference consumption, and so the smww
differs from the standard theory. A crucial consideration for redistributive taxation is how the
smww differs across individuals, and so here across productivity levels. The non-monotonicity of
well-being with the net-wage rate under Narrow comparisons suggests that the smww may fall
less rapidly with productivity under Narrow comparisons relative to both the Broad comparison
case and the standard theory.
It is widely recognised that when individuals have concerns about relative consumption there
is an externality at work that can lead equilibrium labour supply to be ‘distorted’ away from
the socially optimum level. Defining the social optimum is in general a non-trivial exercise.
The Narrow case is the most straightforward: individuals behave in a Nash fashion and so fail
to recognise the interplay between their own decisions and the Nash consumption level when
choosing labour supply. A social planner would recognise that in equilibrium own-consumption
equates with reference consumption and so fully internalise the externality when choosing labour
supply.7 However, in the Broad case a given individual does not affect the average consumption
level across society and so the concept of a social optimum is more nuanced. To capture the social
optimum we use the notion of Kantian calculus: individuals choose their labour supply under the
Kantian conjectural variation that if they increase their own income so too will everyone else, such
that a change in own consumption generates a corresponding change in average consumption.
The Kantian equilibrium concept is increasingly employed in the study of externalities (e.g., see
Roemer, 2010) and here generates an expression for the social optimum that is analogous to the
Narrow case.
The three results discussed above help inform our derivation and interpretation of the optimal
linear tax rates under both Narrow and Broad references. In both cases the optimal tax rate
is characterised implicitly by three considerations: distortion-correction; the covariance between
the smww and relative gross earnings (the equity term in conventional tax expressions); and the
aggregate earnings elasticity (the efficiency term in conventional tax expressions).
The distortion-correction terms captures the fact that reference consumption is an externality
that individuals either do not account for (in the Narrow case) or do not influence (in the Broad
6I.e., concave transformations of utility
7This distortion between Nash labour supply and the social optimum can in principle be corrected by a Pigovian
tax on each net wage (the informational requirements are therefore strict). Layard (2006) and Ljungqvist and
Uhlig (2000) derive this in the context of a homogenous population.
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case). Ceteris paribus, the optimal tax rate rises to reduce the size of these externalities on
average; or equivalently to partially correct the distortion between individual choices and the
socially optimum choices described above.
The covariance between the smww and relative gross earnings corresponds to the equity
term found in conventional tax expressions. In conventional tax theory the smww falls with
productivity, whilst earnings rise. The covariance is therefore negative, thus prompting a desire
to redistribute from those of high gross earnings (low smww) to those of low gross earnings (high
smww). As discussed above above, our well-being results suggest that traditional redistributive
considerations may be somewhat lessened in the Narrow comparison case, relative to both the
Broad comparison case and the standard theory.
As in the conventional framework our tax expression features the aggregate earnings elasticity
in the denominator (Piketty and Saez, 2012). At the the level of generality of the analysis, there
is not too much we can say about this term. The presence of Keeping up with the Joneses
(KUJ) multiplier effects renders labour supply more responsive to the tax parameters, and this
will affect the aggregate elasticity relative to the standard theory. In reality of course, we can
estimate aggregate elasticities and so it is unclear how much the theory adds in this regard.
Our numerical example seeks to shed light on the balance of these considerations. We augment
the standard isoelastic functional form (Saez, 2001) to include reference consumption, and do so in
a general way whereby reference consumption can be either a pure negative externality or both
a negative externality and an argument of labour supply. The optimal tax rate is increasing
in the weight that individuals place on reference consumption under both Narrow and Broad
comparisons. However, the optimal tax rate is lower under Narrow comparisons than under
Broad comparisons, as suggested by the implications of our well-being results for the smww.
Finally, the optimal tax rate is lower when there are KUJ effects.
As will be discussed below, our paper is not the first to suggest that tax rates rise with rela-
tive consumption concerns. However, we see our main contribution as identifying new well-being
results that add to our understanding of how tax considerations are affected by relative consump-
tion: our well-being results demonstrate that redistributive considerations differ depending on
reference group composition, whilst KUJ effects may heighten conventional efficiency concerns,
both of which may temper the extent to which tax rates rise with relative consumption concerns.
We proceed to discuss the existing theoretical literature.
1.1 Related Literature
A number of papers examine the implications of consumption comparisons for optimal income
taxation. Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) analyse optimal linear income taxation when individual
utility/well-being is decreasing in the average consumption level across society. The disutility of
individual effort is captured in consumption units and so optimal effort is independent of average
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consumption, which thus acts as a pure negative externality (so in contrast to our framework the
reference consumption level is not an argument of labour supply/effort).8 Their finding that the
optimal tax rate increases with the weight individuals place on consumption comparisons is highly
intuitive: an increase in the tax rate (and accompanying increase in the lump-sum benefit) acts
to lower average consumption, and so the externality. Layard (2006) analyses the case where
consumption comparisons are a negative externality and may also be an argument of labour
supply.9 The author focuses purely on efficiency considerations (all individuals have the same
productivity) and demonstrates that the socially optimum labour supply can be attained via a
(Pigovian) tax on income. In contrast to the conventional theory, these behavioural responses
(corrections) to taxation are not a deadweight loss (see also Blomquist, 1993).10
In a nonlinear income tax context, a few papers demonstrate that an increase in the degree
of concern of relative consumption increases (i) marginal tax rates (Oswald, 1983); and further,
(ii) the progressivity of the tax schedule (Kanbur and Tuomala, 2013). The latter analysis
of Kanbur and Tuomala also suggests that an increase in pre-tax inequality lessens the above
two effects. These papers take the reference consumption level to be the average in society.
Alternatively, Micheletto (2010) explores nonlinear income taxation in a three-ability type model
where individuals compare their consumption with that of the next highest ability type. To the
extent that the shadow prices attached to self-selection constraints are high and the disutility of
reference consumption is increasing in labour supply, a reduction in the marginal tax rates faced
by higher types discourages mimicking behaviour and may be optimal.
In the static optimal tax framework income equals consumption, and so consumption com-
parisons are equivalent to income comparisons: the same is not true in a dynamic setting with
savings. A growing literature explores the implications of consumption comparisons for opti-
mal taxation within an overlapping generations (OLG) framework. Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2008) analyse optimal nonlinear labour and capital income taxation in a two-ability
type, two-period model. Tax revenues are used for both redistribution and public good provi-
sion.11 Individuals compare their periodic consumption with the average consumption across the
economy; where the comparisons are captured through the difference between own and refer-
ence consumption. The optimal marginal labour income tax rates are increasing in the weight
individuals place on relative consumption: this acts to lower average consumption. Aronsson
8Formally, preferences in Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) are u(c, c¯; θ); where c is own-consumption, c¯ is average
consumption and θ is the weight placed on comparisons. If z is gross earnings, g(z) the disutility of earnings in
consumption units, and α the net-of-tax rate, optimal earnings are characterised by z = g′(z). This is independent
of c¯.
9Whilst Layard (2006) focuses the discussion on income comparisons, the framework is static and so income
equals consumption. The author recognises that further empirical work is required to differentiate between income
and consumption comparisons (see Layard, 2006, p.26, footnote 6).
10Hopkins (2008) explores the implications that relative income models generate for inequality studies.
11For a study of positive externalities and the excess burden associated with cooperative behaviour see De
Bartolome (1999).
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and Johansson-Stenman (2010) extend the framework to include within-generation comparisons
and upward comparisons (the reference consumption level for all individuals is the average con-
sumption of the high-ability types). The latter case implies higher tax rates on the high ability
to reduce the externality they generate.12 Going beyond atemporal externalities, comparisons
with other people’s past consumption also tend to increase marginal tax rates (Aronsson and
Johansson-Stenman, 2014).
There is also some work that explores income and commodity taxation when a subset of
commodities are subject to relative consumption concerns. Eckerstorfer (2014) analyses a two-
ability type model with a nonlinear tax on income and proportional taxes on three commodities,
two of which are subject to relative consumption concerns: given the restriction to proportional
commodity taxes each tax instrument is required to internalise the externalities associated with
relative consumption concerns.
The analysis of relative consumption also relates more generally to that of positional goods.
Frank (1985) demonstrates that individuals over-consume positional goods in pursuit of higher
rank, but because changes in rank yield no social benefit they are a pure externality. The policy
prescription is thus taxation of positional goods vis-a`-vis non-positional goods.
Finally, a macroeconomics literature explores tax policy and asset pricing when individual
preferences exhibit Keeping up with the Joneses behaviour (Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000).13
1.2 Relative Income and Social Welfare
Should relative consumption concerns be considered in social welfare? A number of authors
discuss whether it is appropriate to incorporate relative consumption into the social welfare
function, particularly if this results in some individuals being made materially worse-off for the
subjective well-being of others (Kanbur and Tuomala, 2013; Piketty and Saez, 2012). This
is essentially a question about whether government policy objectives should be ‘welfarist’ or
‘paternalistic’. Concerning the latter case, a potential danger with simply dismissing relative
consumption concerns as ‘envy’ is that economic policy misses one of the arguments that really
matter to people; and is thus not directly aligned with well-being. Furthermore, there are a
number of reasons people may care about relative consumption, many of which need not be viewed
as ‘negative attitudes’ such as envy (see also Micheletto, 2010). For example, individuals may
wish to assess how their lives are going and in doing so naturally use the achievements of others
as some form of benchmark. We take the view that, in light of the mounting empirical evidence
on well-being and relative income/consumption, analyses which study how policy implications
are adjusted in the presence of such concerns are important. The question of whether people
12The tax schedules must satisfy incentive compatibility (self-selection) constraints to avoid high-ability types
mimicking low ability types.
13See also Wendner (2014, 2015).
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should care about relative consumption is of course a different one.
Furthermore, whilst welfarist and paternalistic governments have different objectives - with
the latter ‘laundering’ what are seen as undesirable preferences - the optimal tax outcomes may
be similar. Indeed, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2017) demonstrate that a paternalistic
government’s attempt to correct the individual behavioural ‘failures’ caused by relative consump-
tion concerns generates tax schedules analogous to those arising under a welfarist government
that attempts to correct the externalities that arise from consumption comparisons.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the general framework
and derives our key well-being results; Section 3 derives the optimal income tax expression;
Section 4 presents the numerical results; Section 5 provides a discussion of an extension to
upwards comparisons; and finally Section 6 concludes the paper. Key proofs and derivations are
situated in the Appendix.
2 General Framework: Model Setup
Consider an economy with the following properties:
(i) Population. There is a population of individuals of size 1. Individuals differ in their
productive ability, n, as distributed with density function f(n) satisfying f(n) > 0 ∀ n > 0
and
∫∞
0
f(n)dn = 1. The fraction of individuals at any given productivity is thus given by
F (n) =
∫ n
0
f(s)ds, where F (n) ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) Preferences. Individuals have homogenous preferences represented by u(c, l, c¯), where c ≥ 0
is consumption; l ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of time spent working14; and c¯ is the average
consumption of some reference group (to be later specified). We place the following standard
assumptions on the utility function:
∀ c¯ : uc > 0 , ul < 0 , uc¯ < 0 , ucc < 0 , ull < 0 , uccull − u2cl > 0 . (1)
Individual utility is thus increasing in consumption, decreasing in labour, decreasing in the
reference consumption level (negative externality); and strictly concave in consumption and
labour. In addition, we assume that both consumption and leisure are normal goods:
∀ c¯ : ucull − ulucl > 0 , ulucc − ucucl > 0 . (2)
(iii) The tax-benefit system. There is a linear income tax system in place under which gross
earnings, nl, are taxed at the rate (1 − α), where α ∈ (0, 1) is the net-of-tax rate, and
14Such that 1− l is leisure.
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all individuals receive a tax-free basic income, σ ≥ 0.15 Linear income taxation captures
the equity-efficiency trade-off of income taxation more tractably than the more general
nonlinear taxation, and as such is afforded much analytical attention (Atkinson, 1995;
Piketty and Saez, 2012; Viard, 2001). This simplification helps us bring out clearly the
effects at work when individual well-being depends on reference consumption, and in turn
how these adjust optimal tax considerations.16
2.1 Individual choices conditional on reference consumption.
Given the budget constraint c ≤ (nα)l+σ, individuals choose their labour supply taking as given
the level of reference consumption, c¯. The Marshallian labour supply, consumption and resulting
indirect utility functions are thus
lM(nα, σ, c¯) = Arg max
l∈[0,1]
u [(nα)l + σ, l, c¯] (3)
cM(nα, σ, c¯) = nαlM + σ (4)
vM(nα, σ, c¯) = u(cM , lM , c¯) (5)
Marshallian labour supply is therefore characterised by
n ≤ −ul[(nα)lM + σ, lM , c¯]
uc[(nα)lM + σ, lM , c¯]
·
(
1
α
)
; lM ≥ 0. (6)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
We let n(α, σ, c¯) := −ul(σ, 0, c¯)/uc(σ, 0, c¯) be the reservation productivity satisfying
lM(nα, σ, c¯) = 0 ∀ n ≤ n but lM > 0 otherwise. (7)
From (6) we can readily distinguish between two cases:
(i) Pure Negative Externality. If −ul/uc is independent of c¯ then so too is lM . In this case
consumption comparisons are a pure negative externality : an increase in c¯ lowers well-being
because uc¯ < 0 but has no effect of labour supply.
(ii) Externality & Keeping up with the Joneses. Alternatively, if −ul/uc is a function of
c¯ then lM is a function of c¯. In line with empirical evidence we assume that ∂lM/∂c¯ > 0
(which formally requires uculc¯ − ulucc¯ > 0). In this case an increase in c¯ lowers well-being
15The decision to let α denote the net-of-tax rate is made for notational convenience throughout the paper.
16A number of papers discuss the potential advantages of linear taxation, namely administrative simplicity and
work incentives (Paulus and Peichl, 2009; Peichl, 2014). Further, (Mirrlees, 1971, p.208) referred to the optimality
of ‘an approximately linear income-tax schedule’.
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because uc¯ < 0 and induces individuals to increase their labour supply via the Keeping up
with the Jones (KUJ) effect.
For n > n(α, σ, c¯) Marshallian labour satisfies
∂lM
∂(nα)
= [uc + lM (ucucl − ulucc) /uc] (D−1) (8)
∂lM
∂σ
= [(ucucl − ulucc) /uc] (D−1) ≤ 0 (9)
∂lM
∂c¯
= [(uculc¯ − ulucc¯) /uc] (D−1) ≥ 0 (10)
where D = [2ucl − ucc(ul/uc) − ull(uc/ul)](ul/uc) > 0 by the concavity (and so quasiconcavity)
of utility.
Remark. From (8) lM ≈ 0 implies ∂lM/∂(nα) > 0: this will prove useful later.
The Marshallian consumption function, cM(nα, σ, c¯), has derivatives
∂cM
∂(nα)
=
∂lM
∂(nα)
nα + lM > 0 ,
∂cM
∂σ
=
∂lM
∂σ
(nα) + 1 > 0 ,
∂cM
∂c¯
=
∂lM
∂c¯
(nα) ≥ 0 . (11)
Finally, the indirect utility function, vM(nα, σ, c¯), has the following properties:
∂vM
∂(nα)
= uc(cM , lM , c¯)lM ≥ 0 , ∂vM
∂σ
= uc(cM , lM , c¯) > 0 ,
∂vM
∂c¯
= uc¯(cM , lM , c¯) < 0 . (12)
Roy’s identity thus holds: ∂vM/∂(nα) = lM · ∂vM/∂σ.
2.2 Reference Consumption: Narrow and Broad comparisons.
Individuals may compare their own consumption with those who are similar to them, or more
broadly across a wide range of individuals. Empirical evidence typically supports the former
(Clark and Senik, 2010; Layard, 2006). For any case the equilibrium levels of reference consump-
tion will be aggregates of individual choices, and so be functions of the tax parameters. We
consider two polar cases:
• Narrow comparison. In this first case we assume that individuals compare their con-
sumption level with those of the same productivity. Since these individuals have identical
preferences, the level of consumption that is commonly chosen in response to a given peer
level of consumption will be, in equilibrium, the peer level of consumption. Therefore, for
each n, we can can define the Nash equilibrium level of consumption, c¯N(nα, σ), by the
condition that
c¯N(nα, σ) ≡ cM [nα, σ, c¯N(nα, σ)] . (13)
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Reference Consumption (Narrow Case).
c¯0
c
c = c¯
cM(nα, σ, c¯)
c¯N
c¯N
Notes. This figure graphically illustrates the purpose of assuming ∂cM (nα, σ, c¯)/∂c¯ < 1.
• Broad comparison. In this alternative case we assume individuals compare their con-
sumption with the average consumption level across society as a whole. Let c¯B(α, σ) denote
the equilibrium level of average consumption across society: formally this satisfies
c¯B(α, σ) ≡
∫ ∞
0
cM [nα, σ, c¯B(α, σ)]dF (n) (14)
Notice that c¯B, being an average, is independent of productivity. This immediately implies
that the effect of changes in individual productivity will differ between the Narrow and
Broad cases.
Equilibrium Condition. We henceforth assume that for any (nα, σ)
∂cM(nα, σ, c¯)
∂c¯
< 1 . (15)
This assumption guarantees a unique solution c¯N at each productivity level, and is in turn
sufficient for a for unique solution c¯B. Figure 1 provides graphical intuition for the Narrow
(Nash) case.
With this equilibrium condition in place we can immediately establish that the reference
consumption levels are multiples greater than 1 of the Marshallian functions:
• For the Narrow comparison case
∂c¯N
∂(nα)
=
∂cM
∂(nα)
(
1− ∂cM
∂c¯
)−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KUJ Multiplier
> 0 ,
∂c¯N
∂σ
=
∂cM
∂σ
(
1− ∂cM
∂c¯
)−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KUJ Multiplier
. (16)
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The effect of a ceteris paribus change in either the gross wage or basic income on Nash con-
sumption is thus an amplification of their effect on Marshallian consumption. Intuitively,
an increase in a type n’s consumption raises peer consumption, in turn causing a type n to
earn more and so forth. Notice that (∂c¯N/∂(nα))(∂c¯N/∂σ)
−1 = (∂cM/∂(nα))(∂cM/∂σ)−1.
• For the Broad comparison case
∂c¯B
∂α
=
∫∞
0
∂cM
∂(nα)
ndF (n)(
1−
∫ ∞
0
∂cM
∂c¯
dF (n)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KUJ Multiplier
> 0 ,
∂c¯B
∂σ
=
∫∞
0
∂cM
∂σ
dF (n)(
1−
∫ ∞
0
∂cM
∂c¯
dF (n)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
KUJ Multiplier
> 0 (17)
The effect of the tax parameters on average consumption is thus an amplification of their
average effect on Marshallian consumption.
2.3 Well-being and the net-of-tax rate.
The indirect utility functions that result under the Narrow and Broad comparator cases are,
respectively
vN(nα, σ) := vM [nα, σ, c¯N(nα, σ)] , (18)
vE(n, α, σ) := vM [nα, σ, c¯B(α, σ)] . (19)
Notice that in the broad case we must distinguish between changes in productivity and changes
in the net-of-tax rate, for average consumption across society is independent of the former. The
equilibrium levels of labour supply and individual consumption that give rise to these indirect
utility functions are, respectively
lN(nα, σ) := lM [nα, σ, c¯N(nα, σ)] ; cN(nα, σ) := cM [nα, σ, c¯N(nα, σ)] (20)
lB(n, α, σ) := lM [nα, σ, c¯B(α, σ)] ; cB(n, α, σ) := cM [nα, σ, c¯B(α, σ)] (21)
In the Narrow case the definition of individual consumption is trivial because cN = c¯N , but in the
Broad case individual consumption differs from the average across society and so the definition
of cB is important.
From these identities, we can establish the following result.
Proposition 1.
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(a) Narrow Case. Given that
∂vN
∂(nα)
= uc(c¯N , lN , c¯N)
[
lN − δN ∂c¯N
∂(nα)
]
; δN := −uc¯(c¯N , lN , c¯N)
uc(c¯N , lN , c¯N)
≥ 0 (22)
it immediately follows that for Nash reservation productivity nN := n(α, σ, σ) we have
∂vN
∂(nα)

= 0 : n ≤ nN
< 0 : n > nN but n ≈ nN
> 0 : otherwise
(23)
(b) Broad Case. Given that ∂vB/∂n = uc(cB, lB, c¯B)αlB but
∂vB
∂α
= uc(cB, lB, c¯B) ·
[
nlB − δB ∂c¯B
∂α
]
; δB :=
uc¯(cB, lB, c¯B)
uc(cB, lB, c¯B)
≥ 0 (24)
it immediately follows that for reservation productivity nB := n(α, σ, c¯B)
∂vB
∂n
= 0 : n ≤ nB> 0 : n > nB ;
∂vB
∂α

< 0 : n ≤ nB
< 0 : n > nB but n ≈ nB
> 0 : otherwise
(25)
Proof: See Appendix.
A number of important messages are contained within Proposition 1. First, in the Narrow
case we can capture the effect of changes in individual productivity and the net-of-tax rate via
the net wage, nα; whereas in the broad case we need to distinguish between changes in individual
productivity, n, and changes in the net-of-tax rate, α. Proposition 1(a) states that in the Narrow
case well-being is decreasing in the net wage rate for workers with productivity close to the
Nash reservation productivity. The intuition for this follows from the two opposing effects in
expression (22): an increase in the net wage rate (i) increases own-income and so acts to raise
well-being at a rate proportional to labour supply (the standard effect by Roy’s identity); but
also (ii) increases the Nash consumption level, which acts to lower well-being. For workers with
productivity close to the reservation productivity the first effect is approximately zero, and so
the second negative effect dominates. The immediate implication of Proposition 1(a) is that,
in contrast to the conventional theory, the worst-off in society are no longer the voluntarily
unemployed or lowest productivity, but instead those of low productivity who work.17 This is
17Proposition 1(a) represents a substantial generalisation to the key result in Ulph (2014): the latter uses a
specific functional form to demonstrate that under Narrow comparisons well-being falls with the net wage for
workers with wages close to the reservation wage.
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Figure 2: Nash Indirect Well-being over the net wage continuum.
n0
vN
u(σ, 0, σ)
nN
vN
Notes. This figure graphically illustrates Result 1(a). Nash Indirect well-being is falling in the net - and so gross
- wage for workers with n ≈ nN .
illustrated graphically in Figure 2.
Turning to the Broad case, Proposition 1(b) states that whilst well-being is non-decreasing in
individual productivity, it is decreasing in the net-of-tax rate for individuals of low productivity
(notice that we do not specifiy workers of low productivity). The intuition follows from the two
opposing effects in (24). For the voluntarily unemployed an increase in the net-of-tax rate has no
effect on own-consumption but does act to raise average consumption, thus lowering well-being.
For workers, an increase in the net-of-tax rate (i) increases own-income and so acts to raise
well-being at a rate proportional to gross earnings; but also (ii) raises average income across
society. For workers with productivity close to the reservation productivity, gross earnings are
approximately zero and so the latter effect dominates.18
2.4 Well-being and the basic income: social marginal welfare weights
In modern tax analysis the social marginal welfare weight (smww) captures the value, in terms
of public funds, that society places on a unit increase in a given individual’s unearned income
(Piketty and Saez, 2012). In the conventional framework the marginal indirect utility of unearned
18Part of Proposition 1 can be generalised to a Piketty and Saez (2012) ‘style’ framework in which individuals
differ in their preferences and earnings ability, with heterogeneity captured by the index i. A type i individual
has preferences ui(c, z, c¯), where z ≥ 0 is gross earnings. Marshallian gross earnings, ziM , satisfy α = −uiz/uic, and
the resulting indirect utility is viM . Letting z
i
x and v
i
x, x = N,B; be the equilibrium outcomes, one can readily
demonstrate that
zix ≈ 0 ⇒ ∂vix/∂α < 0 .
The strength of this result is that the sign of the inequality has changed relative to the standard theory. However,
because we allow heterogeneity in preferences we cannot make interpersonal comparisons and so cannot make all
the claims we do in Proposition 1.
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income is simply the marginal utility of consumption; and so the smww is proportional to the
marginal utility of consumption (and distributional weights as captured by concave transforma-
tions of utility). One can readily establish from (18) and (19) that the marginal indirect utility
unearned income in our framework is
∂vx
∂σ
= uc(cx, lx, c¯x) ·
[
1− δx∂c¯x
∂σ
]
; x = N,B . (26)
Paralleling somewhat our discussion around Proposition 1, (26) illustrates that a ceteris
paribus increase in the basic income generates two opposing effects: it (i) increases own-income
which acts to raise well-being at a rate proportional to the marginal utility of consumption (the
standard Roy’s identity effect); but also (ii) raises the equilibrium level of reference consumption.
This discussion illustrates how the effect of an increase in the basic income on well-being differs
from the standard framework. However, unlike the effect of a change in the net wage/net-of-tax
rate - which for some individuals will clearly be well-being reducing by (22) and (24) - there is
no such clear case from (26). We henceforth making the following assumption:
Assumption. ∂vx/∂σ ≥ 0 ∀ n.19
In the optimal tax analysis that follows in Section 3, we will consider a generalised utilitarian
social welfare function of the form SWF =
∫∞
0
G(vx)dF (n), where G(·) is a concave transfor-
mation capturing societal concern for inequality in utility/well-being levels.20 Under such an
objective criterion, we can the define the smww of a productivity n individual by
gx(n;α, σ) :=
G′(vx)
∂vx
∂σ
λx
; x = N,B (27)
where λx is the shadow price of public expenditure (which in the optimal tax analysis will satisfy
λx =
∫∞
0
G′∂vx/∂σdF (n) and so be independent of n.)
An important consideration for optimal tax analysis is how the smww changes across individu-
als, and thus across productivity levels. In the standard framework the smww falls unambiguously
with productivity (whilst earnings rise), thus prompting a desire to redistribute from those of
high earnings (low smww) to those of low earnings (high smww). Partially differentiating (27)
w.r.t. n and drawing on Proposition 1 allows us to state the following:
Proposition 2. When society cares about inequality in well-being levels (as captured by
G′′ < 0), the smww may fall less rapidly with productivity under Narrow comparisons than under
19While there may be some interesting policy implications that arise through pursuing further the possibility of
a non-positive marginal utility of income, we feel that (i) this case is unlikely; and (ii) considering it will reduce
the focus of the analysis.
20The generalised utilitarian social welfare function is the dominant approach in normative public finance (see
Atkinson, 1995; Piketty and Saez, 2012).
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Broad comparisons (and relative to the standard theory) because
∂gx
∂n
=
1
λx
{[
G′′(vx)
∂vx
∂n
]
∂vx
∂σ
+G′(vx)
∂2vx
∂α∂σ
}
; x = N,B (28)
From Proposition 1 we know that in the Narrow comparison case ∂vN/∂(nα) < 0 for workers
with productivities close to the reservation wage, such that the term in square braces in (28) is
overall positive. Contrastingly, in the Broad comparison case we have ∂vB/∂n > 0 unambiguously
such that the term in square braces is unambiguously negative, in line with the conventional
theory. The sign of the second term in (28) is ambiguous.21
In conventional optimal tax analysis, one employs Roy’s identity - the relationship between
the marginal indirect utility of the net wage and the marginal indirect utility of unearned income
- to write the optimal tax expression in terms of the smww. The discussion around Propositions
1 and 2 has made clear that the conventional Roy’s identity does not apply here. To facilitate
the analysis in Section 3, we thus derive what we term the ‘distortion-adjusted’ Roy’s identity.
Lemma 1. (Distortion-Adjusted Roy’s identity).
• (a) Narrow Case
∂vN(nα, σ)
∂(nα)
· n = ∂vN(nα, σ)
∂σ
· (nlN −∆N) ; ∆N :=
nδN
∂c¯HN
∂(nα)
1− δN ∂c¯N
∂σ
(29)
where ∂c¯HN/∂(nα) is the compensated effect of an increase in the net wage on Nash
consumption.
• (b) Broad Case
∂vB(n, α, σ)
∂α
=
∂vB(n, α, σ)
∂σ
· (nlB −∆B) ; ∆B :=
δB
[
∂c¯B
∂α
− nlB ∂c¯B
∂σ
]
1− δB ∂c¯B
∂σ
(30)
Proof: See Appendix.
We refer to the terms ∆x as the ‘distortion-adjustments’ that are applied to the conventional
Roy’s identity.
21In the strict utilitarian case G′′ = 0 and so the first term in (28) will be zero because there is no concern for
inequality in well-being levels.
16
2.5 Inefficiency of Narrow and Broad Equilibria.
To provide the intuition for these distortion-adjustment terms, it is insightful to consider what
the socially optimum labour supply function is for both the Narrow and Broad comparison cases.
In the Narrow (Nash) case, things are certainly clear: were individuals to recognise the interplay
between their own choices and that of their peers, they would behave differently. Yet, in the
Broad case individual choices have effectively no impact on the average consumption level across
society, and so we must appeal to a different, Kantian, criterion for a social optimum. These
arguments are made clear in the following Result.
Proposition 3. (Inefficiency of Narrow and Broad Equilibria.)
(a) Narrow (Nash) Case. Taking the tax system as given, a social planner would recognise that
in the Nash Equilibrium c = c¯ and so choose lSN(nα, σ) := Arg maxu(nαl + σ, l, nαl + σ),
where the social optimum labour supply function, lSN , is characterised by
nα
(
1 +
uc¯
uc
)
≤ −ul
uc
; lSN ≥ 0 (31)
Comparing this with the Nash equilibrium outcome of nα ≤ ul/uc , lN ≥ 0; we can see
that lN 6= lS and so Nash labour supply is inefficient. This ‘distortion’ can in principle be
corrected by a (productivity-specific) Pigovian tax on earnings set at −uc¯/uc (evaluated at
lSN).
(b) Broad Case. Letting cn(l) = nαl+σ, one can define the Broad social optimum labour supply
function via the Kantian conjectural variation that a change in own-consumption generates
a corresponding change in average consumption. Formally
lSB(n, α, σ) := Arg max
l∈(0,1)
u [cn(l), l, c¯]
s.t. dc = dc¯ (Kantian Conjectural Variation) ;
c¯SB =
∫ ∞
0
cn(lSB)dF (n) . (32)
In this case lSB is characterised by an expression analogous to (31).
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 can be interpreted as follows. In the Narrow (Nash) case, were individuals to
recognise that in equilibrium their consumption will coincide with that of their peers, they would
make different choices relative to those made under the Nash conjectural variation. Indeed, the
second term on the left side of (31) makes clear that individuals internalise the externality of
consumption comparisons when making their choices. Notice that an alternative interpretation
of the Narrow social optimum is that it is the result of Kantian decision making: a productivity
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n individual chooses the earnings level that they would also advocate for all other productivity n
individuals, thus maximising their own well-being and everybody else like them! A key feature of
this interpretation is that we move from a Nash conjectural variation (self-interested calculus), to
what what we might think of as a Kantian conjectural variation: if I change my own consumption
by 1 unit so will everybody else. This thought profess allows us to define a social optimum in
the broad case.
Let the indirect utility functions under the Narrow and Broad Socially optimal choices be
vSN(nα, σ) := (nαlSN + σ, lSN , nαlSN + σ) (33)
vSB(n, α, σ) = (nαlSB + σ, lSB, c¯SB) (34)
From (33) and (34) one can readily demonstrate that
∂vSN
∂(nα)
=
∂vSN
∂σ
lSN ;
∂vSB
∂α
=
∂vSB
∂σ
nlSB (35)
A comparison between (35) and the distortion-adjusted Roy’s identity in (29) and (30) makes
clear why we refer to the terms ∆x as the distortion-adjustments.
We are now in a position to derive the optimal income tax expressions for both the Narrow
and Broad cases.
3 Optimal Income Taxation
In this section we derive a general expression that characterises the optimal linear income tax
under both Narrow and Broad comparator cases. In line with modern tax analysis (see Piketty
and Saez, 2012), our approach will use weighted smwws and elasticities to characterise the optimal
tax rate.
Let zx := nlx, x = N,B, be the gross earnings of a productivity n individual in either the
Narrow or Broad comparison cases. Aggregate gross earnings are thus denoted by
Zx(α, σ) :=
∫ ∞
0
zx dF (n) ; x = N,B (36)
The (purely redistributive) government budget constraint is therefore:22
σ ≤ (1− α)Zx(α, σ)
The basic income level that balances the government budget (for any tax rate) is
22We pursue the purely redistributive case solely for analytical simplicity and ease of notation: no great
additional insight is attained through imposing an exogenous revenue requirement for spending outside of welfare
(the lump-sum benefit).
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σx(1− α) ≡ (1− α) · Z˜x(α) ; Z˜x := Zx[α, σx(1− α)] (37)
The conventional results apply: dσx/d(1−α) = Z˜x−(1−α)dZ˜x/dα and so the revenue maximising
net-of-tax rate, αL, is characterised by
1− αL
αL
=
1
ex
where ex :=
α
Z˜x
dZ˜x
dα
(38)
is the elasticity of equilibrium aggregate earnings w.r.t. the net-of-tax rate.
Optimal income tax problem. The optimal linear income tax problem is thus
αˆx ≡ arg max
α∈(0,1)
∫ ∞
0
G(vx)dF (n) s.t. σ = σx(1− α) ; x = N,B (39)
As discussed in Section 2.4, the function G is a concave transformation of individual well-being
that captures societal concern for inequality in well-being levels.
To proceed, we define the following two terms:
g¯zx :=
∫ ∞
0
gx
(
zx
Z˜x
)
dF (n) (40)
g¯∆x :=
∫ ∞
0
gx
(
∆x
Z˜x
)
dF (n) (41)
where the definition of gx follows from (27); with λx =
∫∞
0
G′(vx)∂(vx/∂σ)dF (n). As found in
some form in standard tax analysis, g¯Zx is the average of the individual smww weighted by relative
gross earnings (Piketty and Saez, 2012). Meanwhile, g¯∆x is the average of the individual smww
weighted by the distortion-adjustment relative to gross earnings.
Proposition 4. (Optimal Linear Income Tax). The implicit expression characterising
the optimal income tax for both Narrow and Broad comparison cases is
1− αˆx
αˆx
=
g¯∆x + (1− g¯zx)
ex
; x = N,B (42)
where 1− g¯zx = −Cov(gx, zx/Z˜x).
Proof: See Appendix.
We can see from (42) that, in contrast to the standard optimal linear income tax expression,
there are now three considerations in setting the optimal tax rate: (i) distortion/externality
correction; (ii) the negative covariance between the smww and relative gross earnings (standard
equity considerations); and (iii) the traditional aggregate earnings elasticity (efficiency consider-
ations). We discuss each in turn.
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(i) Distortion/Externality correction. The first term in the numerator of (42), g¯∆x , captures
the fact that reference consumption is a negative externality that individuals (i) do not
account for in the Narrow case due to Nash behaviour; or (ii) do not influence in the Broad
case. We have demonstrated that in both comparator cases there are social optima in
which individual’s internalise this externality in some form, thus resulting in a ‘distortion’
between the equilibrium choices and the socially optimum choices. Ceteris paribus, the
optimal tax rate rises to partially correct these distortions on average. This is analogous to
the argument for higher tax rates proposed in the existing literature (Boskin and Sheshinski,
1978; Layard, 2006; Ljungqvist and Uhlig, 2000).
(ii) Covariance between the smww and relative gross earnings. The second term in the numer-
ator of (42), 1− g¯zx, is the negative of the covariance between the smww and relative gross
earnings. In the standard theory this covariance is unambiguously negative, thus capturing
a desire to redistribute from those of high gross earnings (low smww) towards those of low
gross earnings (high smww). In our framework, Results 1 and 2 have demonstrated that
(a) the smww differs from the standard theory; and importantly (b) the smww may fall
less rapidly with productivity under Narrow comparisons than under Broad comparisons,
and indeed relative to the standard theory. To the extent that this holds, the redistributive
motives embodied in this covariance may be somewhat lessened in the Narrow case.
(iii) Aggregate Elasticity. At this level of generality, there is not too much we can say about
the aggregate elasticity, ex, in the denominator of (42). In the context of our framework,
the presence of KUJ effects renders equilibrium labour supply more responsive to the tax
parameters than predicted by the conventional framework, and this will therefore affect the
aggregate elasticity. In reality of course, we can estimate aggregate elasticities and so from
a practical perspective it is unclear how much the theory adds in this regard.
4 Numerical Analysis
To gain more understanding into how the different considerations in (42) affect optimal tax rates,
we turn to numerical methods. We view a desirable functional form for the numerical analysis
as one which can capture
(i) c¯ as a pure negative externality; or
(ii) c¯ as both a negative externality and an argument which increases labour supply via KUJ
effects; and
(iii) the traditional model as a special case in which individuals place no weight on income
comparisons.
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In line with modern tax analysis, we consider an augmentation of the frequently employed
isoelastic utility function (see Atkinson, 1990; Saez, 2001):
u = log

(
c− l
1+k
1 + k
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Isoelastic utility
− θ ·
(
c¯
1 + χ · c
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
‘Relative’ consumption
 ; θ ≥ 0 , χ ≥ 0 (43)
The parameter θ ≥ 0 captures the weight that individuals place on consumption comparisons.
One can show that ucθ ≥ 0, such that the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in the
weight individuals place on consumption comparisons. If θ = 0 the preferences reduce to the
standard isoelastic utility function, where 1/k is the labour elasticity. However, if θ > 0 we have
uc¯ < 0 and the parameter χ ≥ 0 determines whether or not c¯ is an argument of labour supply:
• χ = 0: In this case ∂lM/∂c¯ = 0 and so c¯ is a pure negative externality.
• χ > 0: In this case ∂lM/∂c¯ > 0 and so c¯ is both a negative externality and an argument of
labour supply. Indeed, one can readily demonstrate that uculc¯ − ulucc¯ > 0, thus satisfying
the KUJ requirement in (10).
To avoid negative utility in the computations we can always add a positive constant.
The parameter θ can be related to our theoretical analysis as follows: in the context of this
functional form our theoretical analysis is essentially comparing the case with θ > 0 (uc¯ < 0)
with θ = 0 (uc¯ = 0 - the standard model). Our theoretical discussion does not, however, say
much about the size of relative consumption concerns, and so the size of uc¯. A key purpose of
the numerical analysis is therefore to explore how optimal tax rates change when the weight that
individuals place on relative consumption changes (note that uc¯θ < 0).
Whilst one could choose a number of different functional forms for the analysis, this particular
form has the virtue that it (i) embeds the isoelastic utility function; and - in line with our
theoretical analysis - (ii) can unambiguously generate KUJ effects on labour supply. 23
Parameter choices and numerical procedure. For simplicity, we assume that n is
lognormally distributed where log(n) has mean -1 and standard deviation 0.39. We set k = 2,
and consider χ ∈ {0, 1} and θ ∈ [0, 0.6]. We vary θ in increments of 0.025, at each stage
simulating the optimal tax rate that maximises the social welfare function
∫∞
0
u dF (n) subject
to the government budget constraint (see Appendix for the numerical code).24
23Kanbur and Tuomala (2013, p.1208) use the functional form u(c, l, c¯) = log c+ θ log(c/c¯) + log(1− l). Under
these preferences labour supply is characterised by the first-order condition (nα) ≤ (nαlM + σ)(1 + θ)/(1− lM ).
So whilst labour supply is a function of the weight individuals place on relativity concerns, it is independent of
the peer consumption level. There are thus no KUJ effects.
24Note that we could have specified preferences without the log transformation and instead included a G =
log(u) in the social welfare function.
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Figure 3: Simulated Optimal Tax Rates: Narrow and Broad comparator cases.
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(a) Pure NE (χ = 0)
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(b) NE & KUJ effect (χ = 1)
Numerical results. The numerical results are presented in Figure 3: panel (a) presents
results for the case where reference consumption is a pure negative externality (χ = 0), whilst
panel (b) presents the case where reference consumption is both a negative externality and an
argument of labour supply (χ = 1). The two panels have the same structure: on the horizontal
axis θ is varied from 0 to 0.6, whilst the vertical axis displays the tax rate, 1− α. The unbroken
line in both panels is the optimal tax rate under Narrow comparisons, whilst the dashed line is
the optimal tax rate under Broad comparisons.
We can make a number of key observations from Figure 3. First, in each case the optimal tax
rate rises with θ, and thus with the weight that individuals place on consumption comparisons.
The intuition would seem to follow from the g¯∆x term in (42). Ceteris paribus, the fact that
∂2u/∂θ∂c¯ < 0 in (43) suggests that the size of the externality/distortion increases with θ, thus
prompting higher tax rates on distortion-correction grounds. Second, a comparison between
panels (a) and (b) illustrates that optimal tax rates are lower in the presence of KUJ effects than
otherwise. The intuition here may be two-fold: to the extent that KUJ effects render earnings
more responsive to the tax rate (i) conventional tax theory would suggest that redistributive
aims are more constrained, thus acting to lower tax rates; and further (ii) distortion-correction
may be achieved through smaller changes in the tax rate. The latter argument illustrates that
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the interaction between distortion-correction and the aggregate elasticity should not be seen as
a trade-off. Third, in both panels the optimal tax rate under Broad comparisons everywhere
exceeds that under Narrow comparisons. The intuition here may follow in part from Results 1
and 2, and thus the 1− g¯zx term in the numerator of (42). To the extent that the smww falls less
rapidly with productivity under Narrow comparisons than under Broad comparisons, this may
act to lower the optimal tax rate in the Narrow case relative to the Broad case.25
5 Upwards comparisons
In the main analysis we have assumed that individuals either compare their consumption with
those of the same productivity, or against the average consumption in society. An alternative
reference case is that of upwards comparisons, whereby individuals only compare their consump-
tion with those whose productivity exceeds their own. The purpose of this section is to briefly
discuss how our key well-being results are likely to persist in this alternative case.26
In the case of upwards comparisons let c¯U(n, α, σ) be the reference consumption of a produc-
tivity n individual: this is the average consumption of all individuals with productivity s > n,
as implicitly defined by the system of equations
c¯U(n, α, σ) =
∫∞
n
cM [sα, σ, c¯U(s, α, σ)dF (s)
1− F (n) (44)
We assume that (i) there is a unique solution to this system of equations; and (ii) there is still a
unique reservation productivity.
An inspection of Proposition 1 suggests that our well-being result will have a natural analogue
in the upwards comparison case if ∂c¯U/∂n > 0, for the increase in reference consumption resulting
from an increase in the wage will offset the conventional effect for low productivity individuals.27
Differentiating (44) w.r.t. n yields
∂c¯U
∂n
=
f(n)
[1− F (n)]2
∫ ∞
n
{cM [sα, σ, c¯U(s, α, σ)]− cM [nα, σ, c¯U(n, α, σ)} dF (s) (45)
25The nature of these discussions is naturally speculative, resulting from the fact optimal tax rates are implicitly
characterised: terms on the right side of (42) are themselves functions of the tax rate.
26This section is not intended to provide any formal proofs, but rather a first inspection of upwards comparisons.
27Formerly, if we let vU (n, α, σ) := vM [nα, σ, c¯U (n, α, σ)] and lU (n, α, σ) := lM [nα, σ, c¯U (n, α, σ] then
∂vU
∂n
= uc
{
αlU +
uc¯
uc
∂c¯U
∂n
}
.
So long as there a unique reservation productivity such that labour supply is either zero or very low for low
productivity individuals, well-being will decrease with productivity for those of sufficiently low productivity
provided ∂c¯U/∂n > 0.
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The terms within curly braces in (45) can be written more insightfully as
cM [sα, σ, c¯U(s, α, σ)]− cM [nα, σ, c¯U(n, α, σ)]
= {cM [sα, σ, c¯U(s, α, σ)]− cM [nα, σ, c¯U(s, α, σ)]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ {cM [nα, σ, c¯U(s, α, σ)]− cM [nα, σ, c¯U(n, α, σ)]}
(46)
The first term on the right side of the equality in (46) compares the consumption of a type s
individual with a type n individual when both have the same reference group: this is unambigu-
ously positive because we know from (11) that ∂cM/∂c¯ > 0. The second term compares how a
type n individual’s consumption evaluated at the reference consumption of a type s individual
differs from that evaluated at their own reference consumption: if c¯U(s, α, σ) > c¯U(n, α, σ) this
term is positive
If we assert that ∂c¯U/∂n > 0 then the right side of (3) - and so (2) - is unambiguously
positive, thus consistent with the assertion. However, if we alternatively assert that ∂c¯U/∂n < 0
then the sign of (3) is ambiguous: it is only negative if the second term offsets the first, which
seems a stringent condition and requires cases where ∂cM/∂c¯ > ∂cM/∂nα.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has sought to precisely draw out the behavioural, well-being and in turn optimal
tax implications that arise when individual well-being is decreasing in the consumption of some
reference group. We considered two polar cases: individuals may compare their consumption
with those of the same productivity (the Narrow case) or the average consumption across society
(the Broad case).
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to demonstrate - under highly general
preferences - that well-being decreases with the net wage (net-of-tax) rate under Narrow (Broad)
comparisons for workers of low productivity. This arises because the conventional well-being
effect (via Roy’s identity) is offset by the externality effect of increasing reference consumption
for these individuals. This has implications for how social marginal welfare weights change with
productivity.
The externality of reference consumption distorts individual choices away from the social
optimum. Whilst the social optimum is well-documented for cases equivalent to the Narrow case
- where a planner recognises that in equilibrium own consumption equals peer consumption -
the Broad case has received little attention.28 We characterise the Broad social optimum using
Kantian calculus: individuals choose labour supply under the Kantian conjectural variation that
28Layard (2006) derives the socially optimum labour supply for a population of identical individuals.
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a change in own-consumption generates the same change in reference consumption. The Kantian
equilibrium concept is increasingly employed in the study of externalities and generates a social
optimum expression analogous to the Narrow case.
To tractably pin-down these well-being and behavioural implications, we have restricted the
analysis to a linear income tax. This serves to illustrate well how conventional tax considerations
are adjusted in the presence of relative consumption concerns. An important future contribution
will be to undertake the analysis in a fully nonlinear context.
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Appendices
A Derivations and Proofs
Derivation of Proposition 1
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• Proposition 1a
∂vN(nα, σ)
∂(nα)
=
∂vM(nα, σ, c¯N)
∂(nα)
+
∂vM(nα, σ, c¯N)
∂c¯
∂c¯N
∂(nα)
= uc(c¯N , lN , c¯N) ·
[
lN +
uc¯(c¯N , lN , c¯N)
uc(c¯N , lN , c¯N)
∂c¯N
∂(nα)
]
(A.1)
= uc(c¯N , lN , c¯N) ·
[
lN − δN ∂c¯N
∂(nα)
]
where δN = −uc¯(c¯N , lN , c¯N)/uc(c¯N , lN , c¯N).
For n ≤ n we have both lN = 0 and ∂c¯N/∂(nα) = 0 and so from (A.1) ∂vN/∂(nα) = 0.
Contrastingly, for n > nN but n ≈ nN we have (a) lN ≈ 0 by the continuity of the labour
supply function; and (b) ∂c¯N/∂(nα) > 0 by (8),(11) and (16). In this case it follows from
(A.1) that ∂vN/∂(nα) ≈ ucδN∂c¯N/∂(nα) < 0. 
• Proposition 1b
∂vB(n, α, σ)
∂n
=
∂vM [nα, σ, c¯B(α, σ)]
∂(nα)
α
= uc(cB, lB, c¯B)αlB ≥ 0 (A.2)
∂vB(n, α, σ)
∂α
=
∂vM [nα, σ, c¯B(α, σ)]
∂(nα)
n+
∂vM [nα, σ, c¯B(α, σ)]
∂c¯
∂c¯B
∂α
= uc(cB, lB, c¯B) ·
[
nlB +
uc¯(cB, lB, c¯B)
uc(cB, lB, c¯B)
∂c¯B
∂α
]
(A.3)
= uc(cB, lB, c¯B) ·
[
nlB − δB ∂c¯B
∂α
]
where δB = −uc¯(cB, lB, c¯B)/uc(cB, lB, c¯B).
Given that ∂c¯B/∂α > 0 we certainly have from (A.3) ∂vB/∂α < 0 for n ≤ nB (because
lB = 0); whilst for n > nB but n ≈ nB we have lB ≈ 0 and so it is also the case that
∂vB/∂α ≈ −ucδB∂c¯B/∂α < 0. 
Derivation of the Adjusted Roy’s identity Differentiating the equilibrium indirect utility
functions w.r.t. the basic income yields
∂vN(nα, σ)
∂σ
=
∂vM(nα, σ, c¯N)
∂σ
+
∂vM(nα, σ, c¯N)
∂c¯
∂c¯N
∂σ
= uc(c¯N , lN , c¯N) ·
[
1 +
uc¯(c¯N , lN , c¯N)
uc(c¯N , lN , c¯N)
∂c¯N
∂σ
]
(A.4)
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∂vB(n, α, σ)
∂σ
=
∂vM(nα, σ, c¯B)
∂σ
+
∂vM(nα, σ, c¯B)
∂c¯
∂c¯N
∂σ
= uc(c¯B, lB, c¯B) ·
[
1 +
uc¯(c¯B, lB, c¯B)
uc(c¯B, lB, c¯B)
∂c¯B
∂σ
]
(A.5)
Combining these expressions with those in Result 1 we can derive the distortion-adjusted Roy’s
identity.
• Narrow Case. From (A.1) and (A.4)
∂vN
∂(nα)
(
∂vN
∂σ
)−1
=
lN − δN ∂c¯N∂(nα)
1− δN ∂c¯N∂σ
= lN −
[
lN −
lN − δN ∂c¯N∂(nα)
1− δN ∂c¯N∂σ
]
= lN −
δN
[
∂c¯N
∂(nα)
− lN ∂c¯N∂σ
]
1− δN ∂c¯N∂σ
(A.6)
• Broad Case. From (A.3) and (A.5)
∂vB
∂α
(
∂vB
∂σ
)−1
=
nlB − δB ∂c¯B∂α
1− δB ∂c¯B∂σ
= nlB −
[
nlB −
nlB − δB ∂c¯B∂α
1− δB ∂c¯B∂σ
]
= nlB −
δB
[
∂c¯B
∂α
− nlB ∂c¯B∂σ
]
1− δB ∂c¯B∂σ
(A.7)
Derivation of Proposition 3.
• Proposition 3(a): Narrow Social Optimum. The first-order condition resulting from lSN(nα, σ) :=
Arg maxl u(nαl + σ, l, nαl + σ) is
(uc + uc¯)nα + ul ≤ 0⇒ nα
(
1 +
uc¯
uc
)
≤ −ul
uc
; lSN ≥ 0 (A.8)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Suppose we impose a
(productivity dependent) Pigovian tax on earnings, where the net-of-Pigovian tax rate is
pn ∈ (0, 1). One can readily show that the Nash equilibrium is now characterised by
n(αpn) ≤ −ul (nαpnlN + σn, lN , nαpnlN + σn)
uc (nαpnlN + σn, lN , nαpnlN + σn)
; lN ≥ 0 (A.9)
Substituting in the budget-balancing condition σn = σ + (1− pn)nαlN then yields
nαpn ≤ −ul(nαlN + σ, lN , nαlN + σ)
uc(nαlN + σ, lN , nαlN + σ)
; lN ≥ 0 (A.10)
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Given that indifference curves are strictly convex it must hold that setting
1− pn = −uc¯(nαlSN + σ, lSN , nαlSN + σ)
uc(nαlSN + σ, lSN , nαlSN + σ)
(A.11)
yields lN = lSN . 
• Proposition 3(b): Broad Social Optimum. Letting cn(l) = nαl+σ, the first-order condition
resulting from lSB := Arg maxl u(cn, l, c¯) s.t. dcn = dc¯ is(
uc + uc¯
dc¯
dcn
)
dcn
dl
+ ul ≤ 0
⇒ (uc + uc¯)nα + ul ≤ 0
⇒ nα
(
1 +
uc¯
uc
)
≤ ul
uc
; lSB ≥ 0 (A.12)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
Derivation of Proposition 4 (Optimal Tax Expression)
• Narrow Case.
0 =
∫ ∞
0
G′(vN)
{
∂vN
∂(nα)
n− ∂vN
∂σ
dσN
d(1− α)
}
dF (n)
=
∫ ∞
0
G′(vN)
∂vN
∂σ
{(
zN − Z˜N
)
−∆N + (1− αˆN)dZ˜N
dα
}
dF (n) (A.13)
To transition from the first to second equality we substituted in (i) n∂vN/∂(nα) = (∂vN/∂σ)·
(nlN −∆N); and (ii) dσN/d(1−α) = Z˜N − (1−α)dZ˜N/dα. Simple manipulation of (A.13)
then yields
(1− αˆN) =
∫ ∞
0

[
G′(vN)∂vN∂σ∫∞
0
G′(vN)∂vN∂σ dF (n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gN (n)
·
[(
1− zN
Z˜N
)
+
(
∆N
Z˜N
)] dF (n) ·
(
1
ZN
dZ˜N
dα
)−1
and so
1− αˆN
αN
=
∫ ∞
0
[
1− gN
(
zN
Z˜N
)
+ gN
(
∆N
Z˜N
)]
dF (n)
(
α
Z˜N
dZ˜N
dα
)−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/eN
 (A.14)
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• Broad Case.
0 =
∫ ∞
0
G′(vB)
{
∂vB
∂α
− ∂vB
∂σ
dσB
d(1− α)
}
dF (n)
=
∫ ∞
0
G′(vB)
{(
zB − Z˜B
)
−∆B + (1− αˆB)dZ˜B
dα
}
dF (n) (A.15)
To transition from the first to second equality we substituted in (i) ∂vB/∂α = nlB −∆B;
and (ii) dσB/d(1− α) = Z˜B − (1− α)dZ˜B/dα. Simple manipulation of (A.15) then yields
(1− αˆB) =
∫ ∞
0

[
G′(vB)∂vB∂σ∫∞
0
G′(vB)∂vB∂σ dF (n)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gB(n)
[(
1− zB
Z˜B
)
+ ∆B
] dF (n)
(
1
Z˜B
dZ˜B
dα
)−1
and so
1− αˆB
αˆB
=
∫ ∞
0
[
1− gB
(
zB
Z˜B
)
+ gB∆B
]
dF (n)
(
αˆB
Z˜B
dZ˜B
dα
)−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1/eB
 (A.16)
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